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izations about the failure of democracy and the evils of government that come from
phony aristocrats. The opening theme needs wide acceptance today, when so many
are eager to retreat from the civic responsibilities which an interdependent society
compels, and ignore the problems left unanswered by a belief that free enterprise is, as
Harding said of government, "a simple thing." What such a society as ours requires in
organization and procedures to permit the minimum fruits of its productive powers to
be available was well stated thirty years ago by Brooks Adams, who believed that the
conditions necessary for personal "success" destroyed the development of capacities
necessary to administering "the Great Society." Professor Merriam finds in the new
sciences or technologies evidence that man can, by taking thought, accept the responsibilities of citizenship. It is good that youth can enlist under the leadership of
such experience and wisdom.
JoHN M. GAus*'

Teoria eg6logica del derecho y el concepto jurdico de Libertad. By Carlos Cossio.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 1944. Pp. 448. 12 Arg. pesos.
For half a century prior to the end of World War I, Latin American philosophy of law had been dominated by Auguste Comte's positivism. But in the last decades Comte's influence has been replaced by Kant and neo-Kantian philosophy. Instead of a rather crude sociological-biological jurisprudence a philosophy of law on neoKantian lines has come into existence. Together with this change another new development can be seen. From colonial times on, Latin American philosophy of law has hardly
been more than a restatement of continental European jurisprudence, following first
scholastic philosophy, then the French droit awturel of the eighteenth century, finally,
as a reaction against natural law, Comte's positivism. The new turn toward neo-Kantian philosophy follows again, it is true, the rhythm of continental European thought,
a reaction against positivism; but for the first time we see a serious attempt no longer
to be satisfied with a restatement of foreign systems, but to achieve creative, original
thought, to create an original, Latin American philosophy of law.
There is a revival of philosophy of law in Latin America; the number of scholars
dedicating their life work to this field is growing, many scientific journals are entirely
or in part dedicated to philosophy of law, and particularly, works of high quality, making original contributions, are being written; leading philosophers of law have appeared.
While neo-Kantian philosophy dominates the contemporary Latin American philosophy of law, the ruler of Latin American thought in theory of law is unquestionably
Hans Kelsen, the head of the "Vienna School of Jurisprudence," the founder of the
Pure Theory of Law. Even in Brazil, where Comte's influence was not only strongest,
but has also lasted longest, the new trend is making progress; but in Spanish America
the new trend has achieved a complete victory.
But while the work of Kelsen is mostly accepted as basic, as far as theory of law is
concerned, there can also be seen all over Latin America a "new thirst for justice," an
attempt to retain Kelsen's theoretical achievements, and yet to go beyond him in
philosophy of law. This tendency makes itself felt in nearly all of the Spanish American
republics, but the two undoubtedly leading countries are Mexico and Argentina.
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The desire to go beyond Kelsen, not to be satisfied with the mere study of the forms
of law, uses, to achieve its goal, the German philosophy of culture, the phenomenology
of Husserl, the philosophy of values, as developed by Nicolai Hartmann and Max
Scheler, and, finally, the philosophy of life, as set forth by Martin Heidegger and the
leading Spanish philosopher, Jos6 Ortega y Gasset. The result of this desire is mostly
the distinction between theory of law, where Kelsen is followed, and the philosophy of
law, as metaphysics, fully within the realm of pure juridical axiology.
It is against this historical background and contemporary setting that we must understand the work of Carlos Cossio, who, using the same materials, arrives at a result
entirely different from that of the other leading Latin American philosophers of law.
Carlos Cossio, professor of philosophy of law in the University of La Plata, president of the Argentine Institute of juridical and Social Philosophy, is exercising, through
his writings and teachings, through adherents and disciples, great influence in Argentina and all over Latin America; a "Cossio-School" is, so to speak, in the making. Since
1931 Cossio has developed his ideas incidentally in a series of monographs, dealing with
detailed problems; but the book under review is the first systematic expos6 of his doctrine.
Cossio, the head of the "Kelsen-School" in Argentina, starts from Kelsen and his
logical normativism. In an article, written at the occasion of Kelsen's sixtieth birthday
and reprinted in the book under review, he has paid full homage to Kelsen, who is to
him the jurist of the contemporary epoch, a personality of genius, a man who has
achieved a cyclopean task, one of the most extraordinary and fertile cases in the history
of juridical ideas of all times. Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is to him not just another
theory, but a Copernican turn; it means a revolution of legal science, which is only possible as a science since Kelsen; it has an eternal, irrevocable value. No Latin American
philosopher of law has better understood Kelsen than Cossio. Cossio seems to this
writer to be also nearest to Kelsen by the temper of his mind: a logician, a theoretician
rather than a philosopher of law, taking this term in a metaphysical sense, and strongly
polemic in the building up of his ideas. A very substantial part of the book under review is a very detailed polemics with the Mexican philosopher of law, Eduardo Garcia
Maynez, on the concept of juridical liberty.
And this point of polemics is for Cossio a matter of principle. He reproaches the
traditional science and philosophy of law with restating all the opinions held on a problem since Greek times and with confusing philosophy of law with its history. The history of philosophy of law has to present these different opinions, but the philosophy of
law has to use only those which matter for the development; it has to criticize; by its
very nature the science of law is of a polemic character.
The science of law, says Cossio, is not possible without a philosophy of law; but the
latter he conceives in terms of a theory of cognition, of a science of sciences rather than
as metaphysics. Philosophy of law must evolve around the science of law. The utter
worthlessness and sterility of most philosophies of law is, according to him, a consequence of the fact that these philosophies are anchored in some metaphysical pre-suppositions which cannot be proved and can give, therefore, no help to the jurist who is
occupied with the study of a positive law. A fruitful philosophy of law must take as its
starting point the science of positive law, just as Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
took as its starting point natural science. It presupposes, therefore, the existence of a
science of positive law, which excludes any reference to natural law; for the science of
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law can bnly be the science of positive law. This science of positive law exists only since
Savigny.
Philosophy of law, thus understood, has, according to Cossio, four tasks.
The first task is that of juridicalontology, the answer to the question: What is law?
To give this answer he starts from Husseri's phenomenology. The method to be followed in this task is the method of intuition. With Husserl, Cossio distinguishes the objects into ideal objects-here the adequate method is the rational deductive method;
into natural objects-here the adequate method is the empirical method; and finally
into cultural objects-here the adequate method is the empirical-dialectic method, the
method of comprehension, of seeing something in its meaning. Law is a cultural object.
But among the cultural objects he distinguishes the objects produced by human activity and human conduct as such. The latter, because of being related to the ego, he
calls "egological" objects. Contrary to Recas6ns Siches, law is to him not "objectivated
human life" such as a statue, but "living human life"-human conduct. Hence the
name "egological theory of law" for his doctrine.
On this basis and by the method of intuition he answers the question, What is Law,
by saying: Law is human conduct in its intersubjective relationship. Here is the first
original idea of Cossio: As law is human conduct, it is human conduct which is the object of the science of law. This science is, in consequence, not a science of ideal objects,
the legal norms, but the science of human conduct, and hence a science of reality, an
empiric science, but not of an experience of nature, but of juridical experience, of human conduct, which is "metaphysical liberty phenomenalized."
The science of law is the science of human conduct; but as a science it is cognition
by conceptions. It needs, therefore, concepts; these concepts are the legal norms. The
part of philosophy of law which deals with the norms isfornaljuridicallogirs. Here the
method is not intuition, but thinking. Whereas the science of law has as its object human conduct, the object of formal juridical logics is norms. Science is not possible without logics. But the logics must be adequate to the object of a science. And as human
conduct in its intersubjective relationship is an experience of liberty, not of necessityan experience of values, not of neutrality to values, Aristotelian logics must necessarily
be fruitless. Only a logics adequate to the egological object of legal science can give true
results, a logic of "oughtness." To have discovered and developed this new logics of
"oughtness" is the immortal merit of Kelsen. The logics which the science of law needs
is neither a logics of subsumption, as in natural science, nor a logics of formalization, as
in mathematics, but 6nly a logics of individualization.
While other Latin American philosophers of law, to go beyond Kelsen, contrast the
pure theory of law with metaphysical philosophy of law, Cossio contrasts philosophy of
law with science of law. The latter has as its object human conduct; formal juridical
logics has as its objects norms, which are merely intellectual representations of human
conduct, concepts with which we think human conduct.
While highly praising Kelsen's work, Cossio reduces it to formal juridical logics,
which is, it is true, an indispensable tool for the science of law, but by no means identical with the latter. It is on this basis that Cossio in interesting pages refutes the erroneous interpretations of the pure theory of law, and gives an excellent, correct interpretation of this theory on logical lines. All the great themes of the pure theory of
law are purely logical problems, problems of law as a single object (the legal norm), of
law as a whole (the legal order), and of the architectonic structure of law. He recog-
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nizes Kelsen's postulate of the purity of method as the right way to liberate the science of law both of the sociological and jus naturae approach. Kelsen's "fundamental
norm" is nothing but the transcendental and a-prioristic pre-condition for the possibility of juridical cognition, is a logical category of juridical cognition in the sense of Kant,
and has no contents. The pure theory of law studies and describes the pure and formal
structures which gnoseologically pre-condition the possibility of juridical cognition.
As the pure theory of law is logics-but the logics of "oughtness"-it is, by necessity, a
priori, formal, neutral to values. Cossio on the whole accepts the pure theory of law as
naked, formal, juridical logics. He tries to introduce some changes here; the most important is the replacement of Kelsen's definition of the norm as a hypothetical judgment by his definition of the norm as a disjunctive judgment, in order to overcome
Kelsen's doctrine of the "primary" and "secondary" norm.
But the pure theory of law is not science of law; it is essentially formal juridical
logics; and only in a minor degree is it, what Cossio calls the third task of philosophy
of law, namely transcendentaljuridicallogics. Formal juridical logics studies the norm
in its normative structure; but transcendental juridical logics is guided by the specific
mode of being of its object. Kelsen, Cossio says, has said again and again that the legal
norms are schemes of interpretation of human conduct. Human conduct cannot be
neutral to values; in consequence the juridical valuation is also a necessary act of cognition by comprehension. As law is conduct, values are immanent in the law. Juridical
valuation means that the norm, the law, must also be understood as order, security,
cooperation, solidarity, justice, which are the juridical values, the spiritual meanings of
conduct in its bilaterality. Formal juridical logics deals with the formal and necessary
elements of law, its logical structure. But law has also material elements; but whereas
the elements of natural experience are only two: the logical structure-formal, necessary-and the empirical contents-material, contingent; legal experience has three
elements: the logical structure-formal, necessary-the dogmatic contents-material,
contingent-and the juridical valuation-necessary, but material. Formal juridical
logics deals with the logical structures as pure fundamental, a-prioristic concepts; the
logical is, of course, neutral to values; justice is no part of the concept of law. Kelsen's
"ought" is a purely logical ought, expressing the relation of legal imputation, is not and
does not want to be an axiological "ought."
But as values are immanent in the law, juridical valuation is a necessary part of the
method of comprehension. Values have no place in the pure theory of law, as formal
juridical logics; but values can, because of the nature of human conduct, object of the
science of law, not be eliminated from the science of law; yet, if the science of law is to
be a science, it must be neutral toward its object, it must not deform the object by approaching it with preconceived ideas of a purely subjective and metaphysical character. That is why, contrary to the systems of other Latin American philosophers of law,
Cossio considers only the positive values-from order to justice--embodied in a positive legal order. These positive values are data given to the jurist in the positive law.
The juridical valuation by the legislator is politics; the critique of the positive values
of a legal order is metaphysics; but the jurist has to deal with the positive values as
given in a positive legal order. It is in this way that Cossio arrives, starting from Kelsen's logical normativism, to his own "valuating normativism," which he now calls the
egological theory of law. Purejuridicalaxiology, on the other hand, as a fourth task of
philosophy of law, does not deal with the positive values of a positive legal order, but
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asks whether these positive values are also the "true values"; it is, therefore, of eminently metaphysical character. Cossio, while fully acknowledging the value problem of
law, does not explain it by the metajuridical notion of a superstructure, transcending
the positive law, but by the immanence of positive juridical values in positive law. It is
perfectly legitimate for a lawyer to ask what the "true ideal" of justice is; but when he
does, he does so as a man, not as a jurist.
JOSEF L. KuNz*

Librarian's Guide to Title-Page Russian and Principles of Transliteration, with an Introduction to Russian Law Books. By Elsie Basset. New York: Columbia University Libraries, 1944. Pp. 47. $1.50.
In three main chapters, entitled respectively, "Language," "Cataloging Processes,"
and "Official Publications," Miss Basset has attempted to give a first-aid r6sum6 of
problems confronting the cataloger of Russian law books. The attempt, it must be conceded, is a considerable success. The worst that can be said about the work is that it
is too sketchy, too dependent upon the author's own experiences in handling Russian
publications. This, naturally enough, results in a certain limitation of scope, especially
as regards principles and over-all problems. On the other hand, such problems and solutions as are discussed are characterized by that concreteness of statement which is the
direct result of individual experience.
Apart from a suggestive discussion of various systems of transliteration in more or
less common practice, the most useful contribution in the first chapter is a list of 330
Russian words most commonly encountered on title pages of Russian legal publications. These are given in both the original characters and in transliteration with the appropriate English meaning. The chapter devoted to cataloging is concerned with the
treatment of legal publications only, and on this subject Miss Basset obviously writes
with authority. The list of "Official Publications" is made up of legal chronologies and
published collections of laws and statutes. Each item is carefully identified and the
whole may be taken as basic for any standard collection of Russian law. A bibliography
of fifty-seven reference tools, including dictionaries, grammars, language and transliteration guides, and works on the political and legal history of Russia, complete the
"Guide." Thus, although primarily intended for the law librarian, Miss Basset has prepared a valuable aid for all librarians who may be called upon from time to time to
handle books in the Russian language.
AaRx B. BERIHOLDt

Treaties in Force, a List. Washington: Department of State, 1944. Pp. viii, 275. $0.40.
A list of all treaties and other international acts in force as of December 31, 1941,
between the United States and other countries. Treaties are grouped by subject matter,
and references are given to the place where the full text can be found.
* College of Law, University of Toledo.
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